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ABstrACt
The Majjhe sutta, which comes in The Book of the Sixes 
(chakka nipāta) of the Aṅguttara-nikāya, incorporates 
six interpretations (by six different elder monks) of the 
Buddha’s phrase ‘the middle’. Later, they await the verdict 
of the Buddha to make it clear whose understanding was 
the most reliable. After hearing a report of their discussion, 
the Buddha consented to all six definitions and further 
drove away their doubts by explicitly confirming the first 
monk’s version. The term ‘majjhena’, which means ‘the middle’ 
or ‘Central Philosophy’, occasionally appears in the Nikāya 
texts and is similar to the term ‘majjhe’ ([in] the middle). 
Furthermore, while the term ‘majjhimā’ symbolizes ‘the 
middle path’, the ‘majjhe’ of the Majjhe sutta stands for 
neither of these two meanings. However, by using the term 
‘majjhe’, the sutta does present expositions akin to ‘majjhena’ 
as ‘Central Philosophy’. Thus, this paper proposes to 
compare the similarities and dissimilarities between ‘the 
middle’ (majjhe) and ‘Central Philosophy’ (majjhena). In 
addition, it aims to question the possibility of the setting 
up of a different middle teaching in the Majjhe sutta, one 
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which differs from the Kaccāyanagotta sutta. The scope 
of this paper addresses the “philosophical” aspect of 
‘the middle’ in Buddhism.
introduction
The Majjhe sutta acts as a commentary on a verse (#1042) 
of the Tissametteyya sutta in the Pārāyana-vagga of the Sutta-nipāta. 
The verse runs:
So ubh’anta-m-abhiññāya  majjhe mantā na lippati
Taṃ brūmi mahāpuriso ti, so idha sibbinim accagā’’ ti.  
Scholars have used various terms for translating ‘majjhe’. Fausboll’s 
translation is ‘the middle’  while N. A Jayawickrama translates it as 
‘in between’.  K. R. Norman translates ‘majjhe’ as ‘the middle’.  Among 
them, the most precise meaning for ‘majjhe’ would be ‘the middle’, that 
which rejects the two extremes. The aim of the verse is to refer to the two 
extremes and avoid being attached to either of the extremes as well as to 
the middle. The statement “by wisely not clinging to the middle” (majjhe 
mantā na lippati)  refers to the early Buddhist teaching of the non- 
substantiality of Dhamma (dharma nairātmyatā) as described in the 
Alagaddūpama-sutta.  In other words, according to the Kaccānagotta 
sutta, the middle causality - paṭiccasamuppāda - or as later traditions 
suggested, śūnyatā (as the middle) , are also to be avoided.  Thus, the 
statement “by wisely not clinging to the middle” (majjhe mantā na lippati) 
is similar to “the doctrine also should be removed” (dhammāpi pahātabbā). 
The six interpretations concerning ‘the middle’ offered by the 
monks are: the Cessation of contact, the Present (moment), feeling neither 
displeasure nor pleasure, Consciousness (which appears twice among 
these six) and the Cessation of personal existence.  
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01. Contact is an extreme, arising of contact is the second extreme, 
ceasing of contact is the middle (phasso kho, āvuso, eko anto, 
phassasamudayo dutiyo anto, phassanirodho majjhe)
02. The past is an extreme, the future is the second extreme, the 
present is the middle (atītaṃ kho, āvuso, eko anto, anāgataṃ 
dutiyo anto, paccuppannaṃ majjhe)
03. Pleasure is an extreme, displeasure is the second extreme, 
neither displeasure nor pleasure is the middle (sukhā, āvuso, 
vedanā eko anto, dukkhā vedanā dutiyo anto, adukkhamasukhā 
vedanā majjhe)
04. Name is an extreme, Form is the second extreme, consciousness 
is the middle (nāmaṃ kho, āvuso, eko anto, rūpaṃ dutiyo anto, 
viññāṇaṃ majjhe)
05. The six senses are an extreme, the six objects are the second 
extreme, consciousness is the middle (cha kho, āvuso, ajjhattikāni 
āyatanāni eko anto, cha bāhirāni āyatanāni dutiyo anto, 
viññāṇaṃ majjhe)
06. Personal existence is an extreme, arising personal existence is 
the second extreme, ceasing personal existence is the middle  
(sakkāyo kho, āvuso, eko anto, sakkāyasamudayo dutiyo anto, 
sakkāyanirodho majjhe) 
It should be noted here that although these six interpretations 
are given in the Pali version, the Āgama literature offers only five 
interpretations.  Another significant difference between the Pali text and the 
Āgamas is that the latter do not offer a definition of ‘the middle’.  Based 
on this, I would argue “the middle” as discussed in the Majjhe sutta has 
no categorical connection with the Kcc of the Saṃyutta-nikāya. These 
interpretations evidently were dependent upon the intuition (sakaṃ 
paṭibhānaṃ)  of each monk. On the other hand, these interpretations are 
not strong enough to lead us to conclude that the teachings of the Majjhe 
sutta are totally different from the Kcc. After examining the content of the 
Majjhe-sutta and the Kcc, the following hypotheses can be formulated:
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1. The discussion between Kaccāyanavaccagotta and the 
Buddha took place after the discourse of the Majjhe-sutta in 
the Aṅguttara-nikāya. 
2. None of the six monks had learned the Kcc before they created 
their own interpretations on ‘the middle’.
3. There may be a significant likeness between ‘the middle’ and 
the Central Philosophy discussed in the Majjhe-sutta and in 
the Kcc respectively.
4. There might be dissimilarities between ‘the middle’ and the 
Central Philosophy discussed in the aforementioned sources.
‘the middle[s] discussed in the Majjhe Sutta
The Majjhe-sutta is explicitly based on the Sutta-nipāta, a text 
which is considered one of the earliest parts of the Pali Canon. The doctrinal 
validity and reliability of the Sutta-nipāta places the Parayana vagga in 
a high position among the early texts. Also, four of the interpretations 
found among the six monks are related to the twelve-fold causality of 
Paṭicca-samupāda discussed in the Kcc:  contact (01), feelings (03), 
name and form (04), six faculties (05).  However, the two additional ones 
[time and personal existence (sakkāya)] are seemingly independent and 
the Kcc might have developed a different middle teaching in Buddhism. 
Since there is no known reason to suspect the Majjhe sutta as added later, 
a possible argument could be that these six interpretations came out 
before Kaccanavaccagotta met the Buddha and, thus, the six monks might 
not have been aware of the twelve links as being ‘the middle’. Another 
possibility is that the Kcc had already been taught as a discourse, but the 
six monks had not learnt of it. Or, they might have intentionally avoided 
the middle teaching in the Kcc. Regardless of which case happens to be 
correct, we can say that two independent interpretations arose among the six. 
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Contact-based middle 
In the first monk’s interpretation, contact is considered an extreme, 
arising of contact is considered the second extreme, and the cessation of 
contact is the middle. The contact (phasso) and the cessation of the contact 
(phassanirodho) are common to the Kcc and appear in descending order 
(saḷāyatananirodhā phassanirodho; phassanirodhā vedanānirodho).  As 
the Kcc remarks, the cessation of contact depends on the ceasing of the 
senses.  However, the first interpretation declared in the Majjhe sutta 
undertakes a more comprehensive exposition than the teachings of the 
Kcc.  Considering the framework of the Majjhe sutta, three steps can be 
deduced, the third one being cessation (of contact, consciousness, feeling 
and personal existence). This form of expression is similar to the third 
truth of the four noble truths and to the teachings of the Sammādiṭṭhi 
sutta (MN. sutta 9), which appears in the framework of the four noble 
truths. Thus, it is clear that the above has applied the framework of the 
four noble truths. The “cessation of the contact” found in the Majjhe sutta 
becomes “the middle”. The same ‘contact’ is met in the twelve links, 
which is known as the middle in the Kcc. Again, the cessation of contact 
appears to be the third step of fourfold contacts in the Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta. 
The other notable factor here is, referring to all the above three 
sources, is its restriction to a philosophical perspective. Apparently, the 
Majjhe sutta does not discuss the practical path for going beyond the 
middle. The Kcc also is taken as a discourse describing the middle in 
its philosophical aspects. Also, in the third of the four-fold steps in the 
Sammāditthi sutta, we see that “cessation” should be taken in a philosophical 
sense, since it is the fourth step which explains the practical path required 
to cease what has originated.
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time-based middle 
The second monk’s interpretation is based on the time. The past is 
considered an extreme and the future is considered another extreme. The 
present is the middle. A similar teaching found in the Vibhaṅga-vagga 
of the Majjhima-nikāya leads to understanding time to be the middle.  
Arahant Kaccāna proclaims:
How is one vanquished in regard to presently arisen states? 
In regard to the eye and forms that are presently arisen, 
one’s consciousness is bound up with desire and lust … 
one delights in that. When one delights in that, one is 
vanquished in regard to presently arisen states.  
This contends that one who hopes to reach the supra-mundane 
stage has to cut off attachment to the present moment. In other words, 
the supra-mundane state could be perceived beyond the present moment. 
How could this teaching be compared to the Majjhe-sutta? The statement 
“ubhantamabhiññāya” means “knowing both past and future” and “Majjhe 
mantā na lippati” means to go beyond the present moment. 
In addition, the Attadaṇḍa-sutta of the Sutta-nipāta also imparts 
the same teaching “he who has passed beyond sensual pleasure here, 
the attachment which is hard to cross over in the world, does not grieve, 
[and] does not worry. He has cut across the stream, he is without bond”.  
Further, this commentary also provides the explanation as “not clinging 
to the middle means, not attaching to the objects like forms even in the 
present moment.” In addition, the commentary of the Bhadrāvudha 
mānavapucchā defines the present to be ‘the middle’. Similarly, the 
Jatukaṇṇimānavapucchā  also contains the same teaching. 
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feeling-based middle 
Pleasurable feeling is here considered one extreme, painful feeling 
is considered as the second extreme, and neither displeasure nor pleasure 
(adhukkhamasukha) is the middle. In the synthesis of the above three, a 
connection with the Kcc  appears based on the occurrence of ‘feelings’ 
(vedanā), which are elsewhere (see: D.iii.216) divided into three.  However, 
‘neither displeasure, nor pleasure’ cannot be shown to be acting as ‘the 
middle’ of vedanā in the Kcc. Nevertheless, it is claimed that the cessation 
of the feelings, or the holder of adukkhamasukha or Upekkhā, ought to 
cross one more step.  Pertaining to this, the Aṭṭhakanāgara sutta shows 
that the fourth Jhāna centered on upekkhā leads to the attainment of 
Nibbāna. Accordingly, a person going beyond the fourth Jhāna (majjhe 
mantā nalippati), and entering Nibbāna would be in the middle.  
 
name and form-based middle
The name (nāma) is considered an extreme, form (rūpa) is 
considered a second extreme and consciousness is the middle. The Kcc 
suggests the possibility of ascribing consciousness (viññāṇa) as the link 
of the middle. However, viññāṇa’ in Buddhism is a difficult concept to 
understand because it is used in multi-contexts.  
The question here concerns which perspective of the viññāṇa could 
be defined as the middle. The commentary of the Majjhe-sutta interprets 
that “in the middle is called the relinking-consciousness and the rest 
of consciousness placed between name and form arisen depending on 
name and form.” The first part of this interpretation could be accepted. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ‘viññāṇa’ found in the Majjhe- 
sutta appears in two different contexts. Therefore, it is presumed that the 
‘viññāṇa’ (placed between name and form) implies the birth consciousness 
only. As the Mahānidāna-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya shows, consciousness 
depends on the name and form and vice versa.  Especially, understanding 
that name and form are two extremes which should be avoided, and 
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going beyond the birth consciousness (in the sense of not clinging to the 
relinking), should be understood as not clinging to the middle.
six-senses-based middle
The six-senses are considered one extreme, the six-objects are 
considered the second extreme, and consciousness is in the middle. 
According to the commentary of the Majjhe-sutta, the viññāṇa found in 
this context is called the Kamma consciousness.   
Both the Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta and the Kcc contain the links of 
name and form and six sense faculties. The dissimilarity regarding the 
six sense faculties in the above suttas only regards the format followed 
by the Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta, which explains the six sense faculties within 
the framework of the four noble truths. However, the six-sense-faculties 
-based middle in the Majjhe-sutta corresponds to the third step of the 
four-fold framework in the Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta. However, there is no 
structural similarity between the Majjhe sutta and the Kcc. Yet, it should 
be noted that cessation of the six sense faculties is identical for all the 
above three sources. It indicates that the Majjhe sutta was not a discourse 
which appeared accidently in the Sutta pitaka, and it could well be taken 
as a variant on the way of teaching the Middle as that found in the Kcc.
personal existence-based  middle
The sixth and last interpretation is based on personal existence. 
Personal existence (self-body or five aggregates) is considered one 
extreme, arising of personal existence is considered the second extreme 
and the middle is the cessation of personal existence. The Kcc does not 
give any relevant account of personal existence (sakkāya). The Sakkāya, 
a synonym for the five aggregates, and its arising leads to extremes. 
By this explanation, the middle is known to be the cessation of personal 
existence (aggregates). However, the Sakkāya-sutta in the Saṃyutta-nikāya 
presents sizable evidence to understand personal existence through the 
structure of four noble truths.  As the this sutta has explained, the way to 
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cease the personal existence is based on the noble eightfold path. Also, 
the Cūḷavedalla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya gives a similar account on 
the ‘cessation of personal identity’ (sakkāyanirodha).
Further, defining sakkāyanirodha, the Cūḷavedalla sutta asserts, 
“it is the remainderless fading away and ceasing, the giving up, relinquishing, 
letting go, and rejecting of that same craving.”  Although this interpretation 
of the Majjhe-sutta is identical with the teachings of Sammaditthi sutta, 
it is impossible to find anything which establishes a direct connection 
with the middle discussed in the Kcc. 
the development of different middles in early Buddhism
The question remains as to why the Theravada or Mahayana do 
not refer to the Majjhe-sutta. Though we find this in the Saṃyutta Āgama, 
substantial evidence has not come to light that this sutta was used by 
Sanskrit scholars to describe the middle in Buddhism.   In portraying the 
middle, the Theravada treatises refer to the Kcc of the Saṃyutta-nikāya. 
For instance, the Paññābhūmi niddesa, the most essential chapter of the 
Visuddhimagga, refers to the Kcc.  Obviously, the middle teachings in the 
Majjhe-sutta were disregarded in the most famous Theravada treatises. 
However, the commentator of the Cullaniddesa (a commentary on the 
Pārāyana-vagga), Venerable Upasena, was not interested in applying the 
Kcc to describe the two extremes and the middle.  His response manifests 
how he disagreed with the traditional belief in defining the middle. On the 
other hand, it can be possible that Venerable Upasena might have been 
influenced by the opinions of the elders as explained in the Cullaniddesa.  
Disagreements were common among the reciters regarding the doctrinal 
and historical intepretation.   Therefore, by not referring to the Kcc, and 
portraying the middle in the Cullaniddesa or its commentary, it can also 
be inferred that the authors of these texts followed a different tradition 
from the group who adopted the Kcc to explain the middle. However, 
this leads to a speculation that Venerable Upasena practiced a specific 
tradition that followed a typical [early] Buddhist doctrine. 
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Further, there were certain elders who understood the middle in 
contrast to the Kcc. An assumption that can be drawn from this is that the 
chain of Dependent-Origination was a teaching applied in response to the 
Brahmins or the monks who entered the Buddhist order from Brahmin 
families. As Venerable Rahula suggests, the Buddha predominately applied 
two types of expositional ways to substantiate the concept of non-self 
(anatta). One of them was the chain of Dependent-Origination that, 
according to Collins, the Buddha introduced to oppose the Brahmins’ 
teachings.  While the Buddha was referring to Dependent-Origination to 
explain the middle, the listeners were Brahmins or monks from Brahmin 
families. For instance; in the Kcc, the listener (Kaccāyana) was a 
Brahmin. In the Dhammadāyāda-sutta, the Buddha addressed Arahant 
Sāriputta, who was from a Brahmin family. Also, certain suttas in the 
Nidāna-saṃyutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya like Aññatara, Jāṇussoni, 
Lokāyatika, which do not record the details of the listeners also 
presumably were delivered to Brahmins. Except for the above sources, 
no other reference in the Pali Canon that holds the term ‘Majjhena’ in 
the philosophical sense of ‘the middle’ could be found. The reason for 
this could be that the method in twelvefold causality was more familiar 
to Brahmins in understanding the middle in Buddhism. This point can be 
fortified with a view proposed by Joanna Jurewicz in one of her articles. 
She argues that the paticcasamuppāda in Buddhism was directed against 
Vedic ideas.  As just mentioned, Collins also notes that the twelve-fold 
Dependent-Origination was applied to oppose Brahmanism. As Taber 
argues, the Buddha learnt the Vedas either second or third-hand during 
his ascetic period.  It is obvious that Buddhism incorporated many 
non-Brahmanical methods. We might therefore suggest that the way 
of understanding the middle in Buddhist teachings by non-Brahmins 
was different because they were freer from dogmas than the Brahmins. 
Thus, it is clear that the commentator Upasena evaded the Kcc, which 
explained the middle to a Brahmin using the paticcasamuppāda, while 
Buddhaghosa referred to it.  Accordingly, I suggest that these six monks 
in the Majjhe-sutta were from non-Brahmin families. And furthermore, 
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their way of elaborating the middle might have been followed by the 
different groups of elders like Upasena.
Conclusion
This discussion shows that the Majjhe-sutta significantly developed 
a verse which appears in the Tissametteyya-sutta of the Sutta-nipāta and 
led to six new varied interpretations. The well-known middle, the chain 
of Dependent-Origination revealed in the Kcc of the Saṃyutta-nikāya 
varies from ‘the middle’ that comes to light in the Majjhe-sutta. This 
demonstrates that there are multiple methods for understanding ‘the 
middle’ in Buddhism.
However, the Majjhe-sutta shows similarities with the Kcc in 
relation to the contact-based, name-and-form-based, six-senses-based, 
and feeling-based middles while the other two remain independent. 
I understand that feeling, six-senses-based and personal identity are closer to 
the format of the four noble truths than the paṭicca-samuppāda. The time-based 
middle is identical to that we find in the Bhaddekaratta-sutta (MN. sutta 
131). Also, sakkāyanirodha, saḷāyatananirodha and viññānanirodha, 
which became the middle are similar to the teachings in the third step of 
the four noble truths. This careful analysis indicates that the Pali canonical 
literature holds various (philosophical) teachings concerning the middle, 
and there is no justification for considering Dependent-Origination to be 
the only way to understand ‘the middle’ philosophically in Buddhism, 
because it was especially directed against the Brahmins. The non-Brahmin 
followers were familiar with different middles (like cessation of contact or 
cessation of feeling) because their thoughts or views were not influenced 
by Vedic or Brahmanical teachings, particularly, with the belief of a 
creator or Ātman. 
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29 According to this sutta, the Buddha realized that when consciousness does 
not go beyond name and form to condition other factors such as the six sense bases 
etc, then beings are not born again. As long as consciousness and name and form 
mutually condition each other for their emergence, they live, die and are born again. 
This realization of the Buddha again implies that if the cause (mental formation) of both 
consciousness and name-and-form does not appear, then, one can completely stop the 
entire wheel of suffering., Abhayawansa Kapila: 163
30 Once, it is found in the chain of Dependent Origination. Again, it comes as a 
part of five aggregates. Next, it appears as the connection of the inner sense and external 
object. The Sumangalavilāsinī throws light on the term viññāṇa. This text solves the 
controversial concept by interpreting viññāṇa as ‘Nibbana’ (‘Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, 
anantaṃ sabbatopabhaṃ/Ettha āpo ca pathavī, tejo vāyo na gādhati./Ettha dīghañca 
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rassañca, aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ;/Ettha nāmañca rūpañca, asesaṃ uparujjhati;/
Viññāṇassa nirodhena, etthetaṃ uparujjhatī’ti. T. W. Rhys Davids, & J. E. Carpenter, 
Dīghanikāya. I. (London: Pali Text Society 1975), 222.
31 Catutthavāre viññāṇaṃ majjheti paṭisandhiviññāṇampi sesaviññāṇampi 
nāmarūpapaccayasamudāgatattā nāmarūpānaṃ majjhe nāma., H. Kopp, Aṅguttaranikāya 
Aṭṭhakathā (Manorathapūraṇī). III. (London: Pali Text Society 1966), 404.
32 ‘‘‘Viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpa’nti iti kho panetaṃ vuttaṃ, tadānanda, 
imināpetaṃ pariyāyena veditabbaṃ, yathā viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ. Viññāṇañca hi, 
ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ mātukucchismiṃ 
samuccissathā’’ti? ‘‘No hetaṃ, bhante’’. ‘‘Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, mātukucchismiṃ 
okkamitvā vokkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathā’’ ti? 
‘No hetaṃ, bhante’’. ‘‘Viññāṇañca hi, ānanda, daharasseva sato vocchijjissatha kumārakassa 
vā kumārikāya vā, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ vuddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjissathā’’ ti? 
‘‘No hetaṃ, bhante’’. ‘‘Tasmātihānanda, eseva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa 
paccayo nāmarūpassa – yadidaṃ viññāṇaṃ’’ T. W. Rhys Davids, & J. E. Carpenter, 
Dīghanikāya. II. (London: Pali Text Society 1966), 62. Moreover, this opinion can be 
understood by a metaphor found in the commentary of the same sutta thus; Yathā hi rājā 
attano parisaṃ niggaṇhanto evaṃ vadeyya – ‘‘tvaṃ uparājā, tvaṃ senāpatīti kena kato 
nanu mayā kato, sace hi mayi akaronte tvaṃ attano dhammatāya uparājā vā senāpati 
vā bhaveyyāsi, jāneyyāma vo bala’’ nti; evameva viññāṇaṃ nāmarūpassa paccayo hoti. 
Atthato evaṃ nāmarūpaṃ vadati viya ‘‘tvaṃ nāmaṃ, tvaṃ rūpaṃ, tvaṃ nāmarūpaṃ 
nāmāti kena kataṃ, nanu mayā kataṃ, sace hi mayi purecārike hutvā mātukucchismiṃ 
paṭisandhiṃ agaṇhante tvaṃ nāmaṃ vā rūpaṃ vā nāmarūpaṃ vā bhaveyyāsi, jāneyyāma 
vo bala’’nti. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, & W. Stede, Dīghanikāya Aṭṭhakathā 
(Sumaṅgalavilāsinī). II. (London: Pali Text Society 1971), 502.
33 In addition to this interpretation, the commentary posits another two 
definitions; whatsoever consciousness which obtains the actions of the internal faculty 
or faculty of the mind is embodied in this context as ‘viññāṇa’. Otherwise, it would be 
considered as the javana consciousness. H. Kopp, Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā 
(Manorathapūraṇī). III. 403.
34 Chayimāni, āvuso, āyatanāni – cakkhāyatanaṃ, sotāyatanaṃ, ghānāyatanaṃ, 
jivhāyatanaṃ, kāyāyatanaṃ, manāyatanaṃ. Nāmarūpasamudayā saḷāyatanasamudayo, 
nāmarūpanirodhā saḷāyatananirodho, ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo saḷāyatanan-
irodhagāminī paṭipadā, V. Trenckner, Majjhimanikāya. vols. I. 52. It is obvious that the 
Sammādiṭṭhi-sutta indicates the cessation of the six faculties. It is based on the cessation 
of name and form. Nevertheless, the Majjhe-sutta does not hold any corresponding 
teaching to this format and it signifies that the cessation of the consciousness (viññāṇa) 
is the way to cease the two extremes based on six senses.
35 Although Venerable Nyanatiloka suggests that it cannot be accepted as 
‘own body’ (Buddhist Dictionary, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society 1980: 288.) 
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which derives from sva+kāyo [like Sajjhāya; Sajjhāya would be formed by sva+adhyāya 
I assume that it is possible to admit as the term Sakkāya is etiologically based on sva+ 
kāya or own body which is rejected in Buddhism.
36 This statement can be seen even in the Dīgha-nikāya J. E. Carpenter, 
Dīghanikāya. I. 216.
37 Sakkāyoti pañcupādānakkhandhā., Kopp, Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā 
(Manorathapūraṇī). III. 992/Esa sakkāyo yāvatā sakkāyoti yattako tebhūmaka-
vaṭṭasaṅkhāto sakkāyo nāma atthi, sabbopi so esa sakkāyo, na ito paraṃ sakkāyo atthīti 
paṭisañcikkhati I. B. Horner, Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Papañcasūdanī). IV. (London: 
Pali Text Society 1976), 67. Anyway, I am in doubt whether the Majjhe-sutta takes into 
account ‘Sakkāya’ to be the view of personality. Notably, Sakkāyadiṭṭhi or ‘personality 
view’, would be better to understand with sixty-two views of the Dutiya Isidatta sutta 
(Yāni cimāni dvāsaṭṭhi diṭṭhigatāni brahmajāle bhaṇitāni; imā kho, gahapati, diṭṭhiyo 
sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā sati honti, sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā asati na hontī’’’ ti). In case of this, I postulate 
that this sutta suggests ‘the personality’ (Sakkāya) only.
38 Katamo ca, bhikkhave,sakkāyanirodho? Yo tassāyeva taṇhāya…pe… ayaṃ 
vuccati, bhikkhave, Sakkāyanirodho Katamā ca, bhikkhave, sakkāyanirodhagāminī 
paṭipadā? Ayameva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo. Seyyathidaṃ – sammādiṭṭhi…pe… sam-
māsamādhi. Ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, sakkāyanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’’ti., Feer, L., 
Saṃyutta-nikāya, IV. (London: Pali Text Society, 1894)159.
39 Ñāṇamoli Bhikkhu & Bodhi Bhikkhu. The Middle Length Discourses of 
the Buddha, 397 ‘‘Yo kho, āvuso visākha, tassāyeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo 
paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo; ayaṃ kho, āvuso visākha.sakkāyanirodho vutto bhagavatā’’ti 
V. Trenckner, Majjhimanikāya. vols. I. 299.
40 The two together: since any given states are produced without interrupting the 
[cause-fruit] continuity of any given combination of conditions, the whole expression 
“dependent origination” (paþicca-samuppáda) represents the middle way, which rejects 
the doctrines…, Rhys Davids, Kindred Sayings, II, (London: Pali Text Society, 1972)12.
41 Ubhantamabhiññāyāti ubho ante abhijānitvā. Mantā na lippatīti paññāya 
na lippati. [‘Ubhantamabhiññāya’ means: having known both ends. ‘Mantā na lippatī’ 
means: By wisely not clinging to (the middle)] H. Smith, Suttanipāta- aṭṭhakathā, 588.
42 Ko ubhantamabhiññāyāti ko ubho ante abhiññāya jānitvā tulayitvā tīrayitvā 
vibhāvayitvā vibhūtaṃ katvāti – ko ubhantamabhiññāya. Majjhe mantā na lippatīti 
majjhe mantāya na lippati, alitto anupalitto nikkhanto nissaṭo vippamutto visaññutto 
vimariyādikatena cetasā viharatīti – majjhe mantā na lippati. Vipassana Research 
Center, Nidd II (Miyan) 41.
43 Controversies among Theravadins regarding doctrinal or cultural issues 
were common in history. For instance; the Madhuratthavilāsinī suggests that Prince 
Siddhatta experienced the ‘four sights’ in a single day. Nevertheless, the others say that 
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it happened in monthly intervals (Dīghāyukā bodhisattā vassasate vassasate atikkante 
jiṇṇādīsu ekekaṃ addasaṃsu. Amhākaṃ pana bodhisatto appāyukakāle uppannattā 
catunnaṃ catunnaṃ māsānaṃ accayena uyyānaṃ gacchanto anukkamena ekekaṃ 
addasa. Dīghabhāṇakā panāhu – ‘‘cattāri nimittāni ekadivaseneva disvā agamāsī’’ ti., 
I. B. Horner, Madhuratthavilāsinī nāma Buddhavaṃsa - aṭṭhakathā, (London: Pali Text 
Society 1978), 279. This explicitly shows that there were different opinions among the 
Theravada tradition. Thus, it is not hard to assume that Venerable Upasena, the author 
of the commentary of the Cullaniddesa, held a different opinion on the two extremes 
and the middle.
44 “The doctrine of Anatta or No-Soul is the natural result of, or the corollary to, 
the analysis of the Five Aggregates and the teaching of Conditioned Genesis {Paticca- 
samuppada, W. Rahula, What the Buddha Taught. (New York: Grove Press 1974), 52.
45 “In considering the teaching of Dependent Origination, which Buddhism used 
to oppose Brahmanism on the conceptual level, it is crucially important to distinguish 
between the general idea of conditionality, and the twelve-fold series which has come 
to be the traditional way in which the teaching is expressed.” S. Collins, Selfless Person. 
(Cambridge: University Press 1982), 106.
46 In this sutta, Arahant Sariputta extended the teachings that had been delivered 
by the Buddha in brief. It is an example to understand this point clearly.
47 In the Khandha-saṃyutta we find the term ‘majjhena’. Nevertheless, it can 
be confirmed that it was a direct quotation from the Kcc of the Nidāna-saṃyutta.
48 See Pali Text Society Journal (2000) 170
49 “Certainly, the Buddha did not formally study the Veda, for he was not a 
Brahmin; he was not qualified. Had he heard the Veda recited? Did he know Sanskrit? 
Perhaps he heard sermons based on Vedic texts given by other religious teachers, 
perhaps indeed the teachers he studied Yoga under shortly after his renunciation (though 
other Brahmin teachers are mentioned in the canon).”, John Taber (Buddhist Studies 
Review, 30.1 2013) 134
50 Buddhaghosa and ācārya Nāgārjuna both referred to the Kcc or the Nidāna- 
vagga that contained the teaching of Dependent-Origination, and both were Brahmins. 
See MMK XV.7
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